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peaks in the correlator outputs) to the comparison to nonGPS signals (e.g. an IMU). Much of this prior work has
been on the conceptual level with limited experimentation; little appears to have been done to analyze the resulting detection performance.
The detector of interest here monitors the GPS signals using not one, but two or more receivers with their
antennas at known relative positions. The assumption is
that during a spoofing event these multiple receivers will
receive the same spoofer RF signal in that the satellites’
characteristics (i.e. relative times of arrival) are identical
at all of the antennas. With no spoofer present, each antenna would receive a unique RF signal, consistent with
its position in space. The concept of the detector, then, is
that the presence of spoofing is discernible from the near
equivalence of the receivers’ receptions. While one could
compare these multiple receptions at the RF level, we
compare the position solutions across receivers, declaring
a spoofing event if the resulting position solutions are too
close to each other as compared to the (known) relative
locations of the antennas. The primary advantage of such
an approach is that the hypothesis test does not require
receiver hardware modification or even access to software
GPS methods; a separate processor could easily monitor
the positions output from the receivers.
In this paper we analyze such a detector from a
Neyman-Pearson perspective assuming Gaussian statistics
on the position solution data. We consider four cases: (1)
two receivers with fixed (known) locations, (2) two receivers with fixed separation and known orientation (but
unknown absolute position), (3) two receivers with fixed
separation and unknown orientation, and (4) a three receiver example.

ABSTRACT
GPS spoofing is a hot topic of late; technical discussions vary widely based upon the assumed capabilities
and a priori knowledge of the spoofer. For a single GPS
receiver, various methods to detect a spoofing event have
been proposed in the literature. These range from simple
ideas (e.g. monitoring the power levels of the GPS signals) to more complex concepts (e.g. looking for vestigial

INTRODUCTION
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is well known
to be an accurate provider of position and time information across the globe. Consulting a dictionary, the term
“spoof” or “spoofing” generally refers to a light-hearted
deception. When combined together, GPS spoofing refers
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to intentional (and considered malicious) interference of a
GPS user’s inputs so as to distort the position and/or time
information gained from the system.
GPS spoofing is a hot topic of late; technical discussions can vary widely based upon the assumed capabilities and a priori knowledge of the spoofer. In 2003 Warner and Johnston [1] suggested several possible methods to
detect a spoofing event: monitoring the power levels of
the GPS signals (absolute, relative, and across satellites),
checking that the constellation itself is correct for the given time (e.g. number and IDs of the satellites), testing the
accuracy of the clock component, and even checking
against some non-GNSS source (e.g. an IMU). Since then
various authors have experimented with spoofing and
suggested detectors including correlating the P(Y) code at
the RF level, looking for vestigial peaks in the correlator
outputs, comparing to trusted reference signals, and using
antenna arrays to spatially identify signals (see e.g. [210]). Much of this prior work has been on the conceptual
level with limited analysis of the resulting detection performance.
In this paper we examine a spoofing detection concept and attempt to assess its performance. We assume
that the spoofer, with only one broadcast antenna, has the
ability to present a realistic, but incorrect RF signal at the
user’s location; this would be possible currently using one
of the inexpensive GPS simulators available on the market. We also assume that the spoofer does not have the
ability to interfere with the receiver itself; hence, this is
spoofing by an external entity, not the operator of a vehicle trying to deceive his/her local GPS.
The detector of interest here monitors the GPS signals using not one, but two or more receivers with their
antennas at known relative positions. The assumption is
that during a spoofing event these multiple receivers will
receive the same spoofer RF signal (since the spoofer can
only create one) and that each satellite’s characteristic in
this signal is identical at all of the antennas. With no
spoofer present, each antenna would receive a unique RF
signal consistent with its position in space. The concept of
the detector, then, is that the presence of spoofing is discernible from the near equivalence of the receivers’ receptions. A conceptual discussion of such a detector, and its
ability to detect a single spoofer, was presented by
Tippenhauer et al [11].
While one could compare these multiple receptions at
the RF level (and several of the authors listed above have
proposed such detection schemes), a simpler approach
that could be implemented with existing GPS receivers
would be to have each antenna/receiver compute its position and compare the results across receivers. With such a
detector, one could declare a spoofing event if the resulting position solutions are too close to each other as com-

pared to the known, perhaps relative, locations of the antennas. The primary advantage of such an approach is that
the hypothesis test does not require receiver hardware
modification or even access to software GPS algorithms;
a separate processor could easily monitor the positions
output from the receivers. Given the uncertainty of the
statistics of the signal generated by the spoofer, in this
paper we describe the problem as a hypothesis test and
analyze the detector from a Neyman-Pearson perspective.
We note that our analysis might also be useful for spoof
detection schemes based on comparing sequential positions of a vehicle with a single receiver traversing a
known trajectory [12].
Assuming m antenna/receiver pairs, the hypothesis
test of no spoofer versus spoofer is based upon m sets of
computed positions. Under the null hypothesis (no spoofer), each position solution corresponds to the actual antenna position plus a random offset due to noise. Under
the alternative hypothesis (spoofer present), the positions’
means would be equal across receivers and the noise statistics could be different. Assuming Gaussian statistics on
the position solution offsets, we present detection and
false alarm probabilities for several cases: (1) two antennas with fixed (known) locations, (2) two antennas with
fixed separation and known orientation (but unknown
absolute position), (3) two antennas with fixed separation
and unknown orientation, and (4) an example with three
receivers/antennas.
The organization of the paper is as follows: (1) we
first review the terminology of the detection problem and
present the assumed statistics of the data observed, (2) we
present some experimental results as a sanity check of the
assumptions of the data model, and (3) we develop detection procedures for the 4 distinct cases listed above. Recognizing that our efforts are initial and limited, we conclude with suggested directions for future work (some
obvious and easy, some not so).
HYPOTHESIS TESTING
The development of an algorithm to recognize a
spoofing event is an example of a binary hypothesis test.
To describe our spoofing results, we will employ standard
terminology to specify the test between two hypotheses,
H0 and H1:
H0: no spoofer
H1: spoofer
The detector decides for either H0 or H1 based upon some
observed data. Usually this is implemented by evaluating
some scalar function (called the test statistic) of the data,
T(data), and comparing this value to a fixed value (called
the threshold), λ. Common notation for this concept is
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tion error is Gaussian (due to assumptions of Gaussian
receiver noise and/or the linear nature of the position solution algorithms); the specifics of the model vary under
the two hypotheses as follows:

H1
T (data )  

H0
In this representation it is imagined that the test statistic is
larger in value under the hypothesis H1; we can, and will
below, occasionally reverse the directions of the threshold
test when convenient.



 E 0 eˆk   ek 
E 0 pˆ k    E 0 nˆ k   n k   p k
 E 0 uˆ k  u k 

This form of detection approach results in a binary
decision (H0 or H1, no third result such as “it cannot be
determined” is allowed); hence, two types of errors are
possible:


A false alarm occurs when the detector decides
for H1, but H0 is actually true.



A miss occurs when the detector decides for H0,
but H1 is actually true.

Recognizing that each of these errors has different costs
to the user, we might want to treat them differently. For
example, a false alarm might mean waiting and attempting some task later on new data while a miss might have
more dire consequences. As such, we follow the NeymanPearson formulation of detection:


Set the level of the test, its probability of false
alarm, pfa, to some allowable, but small value
(often written as α):

Under H0 (no spoofing), the mean of each position estimate is the true position of the receiver’s
antenna (no hats)

The covariance matrix for each p̂ k is some nominal matrix

DOP, etc) and is independent of k since the receivers are assumed to be near each other. Finally, the estimates across the different receivers are
assumed independent; in other words, the cross
covariance matrix for p̂ j and p̂ k is a 3-by-3
zero matrix.


Under H1 (spoofing), the mean of each position
estimate is an unknown position, ps, determined
by the spoofer

 E1 eˆk 
E1 pˆ k    E1 nˆ k   p s
 E1 uˆ k 

pfa  PrT (data)   | H 0   


Try to maximize the power, or probability of detection, pd, of the test where power is defined as
one minus the probability of a miss

p d  1  p miss  PrT (data)   | H1 
As stated in the Introduction above, the data available
for the detection method is the (assumed simultaneous)
position estimates from a set of m GPS receivers. For
convenience, we assume that each of these 3-dimenional
vectors is available in a common east, north, up (ENU)
reference frame; so that we have the vector observations

 eˆk 
p̂ k  nˆ k 
uˆ k 

 0 (due to local noise, satellite

Of significance is that this mean is independent
of k (!), all receivers “see” the same position.
Further, the covariance matrix for each p̂ k is determined by the spoofer and is unknown to the
GPS user; we will employ the notation 1 . As
was stated for H0, we will assume that this within
receiver covariance is independent of k. Finally,
the cross covariance matrix for p̂ j and p̂ k is
written as

1 jk and may not be zero as it was

under H0.
A SANITY CHECK ON THE MODEL

for k ranging over 1 to m (we use hats on variables to indicate that they are noisy estimates). For most of the work
below we will consider two receivers, so k = 1 or 2.
To develop and analyze detectors, we need to specify
the statistics of the data under the two hypotheses. For
simplicity, we will make the assumption that the estima-

While a Gaussian model is a good place to start an
examination of a problem such as this (hopefully to lead
to tractable results), it is natural to wonder about the stated assumptions on the means and covariances. Toward
that end we experimented with a pair of GPS sensors at
the Coast Guard Academy. To assess the no spoofer hypothesis, H0, we mounted the receivers at a known separation (approximately 20 feet) on a rooftop and collected
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several days of data (at a rate of 1-second updates). For
spoofing, we brought the same receivers indoors and employed a commercial GPS reradiator (the equivalent of a
meaconing spoofer) and collected another data set of
similar size. The feed of this reradiator was also on the
rooftop, in between the two receiver positions for the no
spoofer test. The observation, then, is a series of 6 dimensional position vectors:

 0.90
 0.06

 0.09
Σ1  
0.58

  0.09
 0.14


eˆ1 , nˆ1 , uˆ1 , eˆ2 , nˆ2 , uˆ2 T

From the scatter presented it is clear that the means
of the observations clearly meet our assumptions – accurate under no spoofing and equal under spoofing. We also
computed sample covariance matrices under both hypotheses. These were

 2.29
 0.56

 0.32
Σ0  
0.08

  0.10
  0.20

and

 0.56

0.32

0.08

3.16  0.00  0.13
 0.00 11.0  0.08
 0.13  0.08 2.29
0.07
 0.01

0.13
0.34

 0.38
 0.33

 0.10  0.20
0.07  0.01
0.13
0.34 
 0.38  0.33

3.22
0.33 
0.33
10.8 

15

0.32

0.32
4.84
 0.0 0.09
0.97

0.22
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95% radius is 4.33 m

north (m)
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5

0

-5
95% radius is 4.35 m
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-5

0
east (m)

5
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Figure 1 – Sample horizontal scatter under H0.

10

5
north (m)

Figure 2 shows the result under the H1 spoofing experiment (meaconing). Now both means appear as a single black dot slightly to the north of zero (again, our
reraditor antenna was somewhat to the north of our defined origin) and the 95% circles are smaller and of
somewhat different radii. We expect that this difference is
due to the higher quality of the reradiator antenna, its amplification, and that when mounted indoors, one of the
two test receivers was closer to the reradiator than the
other.

1.64

0.58  0.09 0.14 
 0.0 0.97 0.33 
0.09 0.22 3.32 
1.76  0.15  0.35

 0.15 2.84
0.36 
 0.35 0.36
9.55 

20

From this data set, we examined the usual navigation performance via the horizontal scatter and then some basic
statistics.
First, Figure 1 shows the horizontal (east and north)
scatter for the rooftop test, no spoofer. The two receivers
were mounted with an almost north-south orientation. The
average position of the more southerly receiver was defined as the zero point for the scatter; typical individual
points are shown in red, the mean as a black dot at the
origin, and the 95% containment circle had radius of 4.35
meters. The performance of the second receiver, approximately 20 feet to the north, is represented in blue (some
of the blue points obscure red ones). Note that its mean
falls just where we expected that it would be (the second
black dot) and the 95% radius is almost the same as the
first receiver at 4.33 m.

 0.06  0.09

0

-5
95% radius is 2.85 m
95% radius is 3.88 m

-10
-10

-5

0
east (m)

5

Figure 2 – Sample horizontal scatter under H1.
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10

We observe that many of the elements of these two arrays
are approximately zero; hence, we propose the following
simple model for the covariances of our two receiver detector:


Under H0 the covariance is

Σ
Σ0   0a
 0

CASE 1 – KNOWN LOCATIONS

0 
Σ 0b 

First, we imagine that the location of the two receivers is precisely known. In that case, the hypotheses are

with



 0
 0


2
e0

Σ 0 a  Σ 0b

0



2
n0

0

0 

0 
 u20 

This simplistic model has all of the components
being independent and the variances being direction dependent.


Under H1 the covariance is

Σ
Σ1   1a
 Σ1ab

and

Σ1ab


0

2
n1

H0: the position observation is a Gaussian random vector in 6-dimensional space with mean
vector and covariance matrix

Σ

p 

   1  , Σ0   0a
p 2 
 0
•

0 

0   Σ1a
 u21 

In this model the components for each receiver
are still independent with directionally dependent
covariances. The covariances across receivers is
now not zero; specifically, the east, north, and up
components are correlated. In our sanity check
data, this correlation coefficient was 0.4.

Σ1Tab 

Σ1b 

How should the detector exploit this statistical difference?
One obvious method is to compute the size (radius
squared) of the Gaussian ellipsoid about the mean vector
under H0 that contains the observation point and compare
this size parameter to a threshold. If the ellipsoid is large,
then we are likely experiencing spoofing. The resulting
test is

T (pˆ 1 , pˆ 2 )  (pˆ 1  p1 )T  01a (pˆ 1  p1 )
 (pˆ 2  p 2 )T  01b (pˆ 2  p 2 )
T < λ decide H0
T > λ decide H1
Beyond being a reasonable test, it uses the knowledge
of the true positions and is amenable to statistical analysis
under H0. Specifically, under H0 the test statistic, T, is
distributed as a chi-squared random variable with 6 degrees of freedom. The false alarm probability is then

SPOOF DETECTORS
Below we develop and analyze detectors for four different user scenarios with the spoofing model described
above; primarily we focus on the case of two receivers.
We note that the independent Gaussian assumption under
H0 will make the development of the detectors and their
false alarm analyses tractable. However, the unknown
statistics (mean and covariance) under H1, even though
the model assumed is quite simple, make the development
of an optimum detector impossible. Hence, we develop
sensible detectors, analyze them under H0 to solve for the

0 
Σ 0b 

H1: the position observation is a Gaussian random vector in a 6-dimensional space with mean
vector and covariance matrix

Σ
p 
   s  , Σ1   1a
p s 
 Σ1ab

 e21 0
0 


2
Σ1a  Σ1b   0  n1 0 
0
0  u21 

0

•

Σ1Tab 

Σ1b 

with

  e21

 0
 0


threshold in terms of the desired/acceptable false alarm
probability, and then, as possible, consider what happens
to the detection probability.

pfa  e



 5
2

k

 k! 2
k 0

k

From this expression, the threshold can be found numerically. For example, λ = 26 yields pfa ≈ 1%. The probability of detection, pd, is, in general, intractable due to its
dependence on ps. We note that it might be possible to do
a worst case analysis (lowest pd); for simple choices of Σ1
this might occur if ps is the mean of p1 and p2. Such an
event is probably not very useful from the perspective of
the spoofer, however, so a worst case analysis in this case
appears to be of little use.

Proc. ION ITM, San Diego CA, Jan. 2013

CASE 2 – KNOWN SEPARATION AND ORIENTATION
Next, imagine that both receivers’ locations have
some unknown offset, but that the vector difference in the
locations is known. Said another way, we are assessing
spoofing on a moving vehicle that has additional sensors
(e.g. a compass) to indicate orientation. In that case, a
natural transformation of the observation data is to the
difference of the observations

 eˆ1  eˆ2 
dˆ  pˆ 1  pˆ 2  nˆ1  nˆ 2 
uˆ1  uˆ 2 

   dT Σ 1 d 
0a

pfa  Pr T (dˆ )   | H 0  1  Q
 2d T Σ 1 d 
0a





We can invert this expression to find the threshold

  dT Σ 01a d  2dT Σ 01a d Q 1 1  pfa 
and, hence, write the probability of detection as



pd  Pr T (dˆ )   | H1

H0: d̂ is a 3-dimensional Gaussian random vector with mean d = p1 – p2 and covariance 2Σ0a

dˆ ~ N (d,2Σ0a )
•

H1: d̂ is a 3-dimensional Gaussian random vector with mean 0 (since the receivers are assumed
to have equal positions under spoofing) and different covariance

In all of these expression, Q(.) is the usual Gaussian tail
probability.
As an example of these results, consider the case of a
horizontal platform (u1 = u2) and equal horizontal
covariances at the two receivers under H0

Σ0a  Σ0a

dˆ ~ N (0,2Σ1a  2Σ1ab )
The unknown covariances under H1 still make an optimum test impossible to construct; however, a natural test
for a difference in mean vectors is to project (under H0)
the observed difference onto that known difference, so we
consider

H0
T (dˆ )  dT Σ 01a dˆ  

H1

H0
Tˆ
d
d
T (dˆ )  2  
0 
H1
(Strictly, in this inner product the contribution of the up
term is zero.) Further, assume under H1 that the
covariances are

As in Case 1, this second test is amenable to statistical analysis. Specifically, under H0 the test statistic, T, is
Gaussian distributed

T (dˆ ) ~ N dT Σ 01a d,2d T Σ 01a d

 12 0
0 


2
Σ1a  Σ1b   0  1
0 
0
0  u21 




and

Σ1ab

It is also Gaussian under H1, but with zero mean and a
different (and unknown) covariance matrix



 02 0
0 


2
  0 0
0 
0
0  u20 


Then the detector simplifies

(Note that the threshold test is reversed from the normal
definition; a large projection corresponds to H0.)





 dT Σ 1 d  2dT Σ 1 d Q 1 (1  p ) 
0a
0a
fa 
 1  Q
T 1
1

2d Σ 0 a Σ1a  Σ1ab Σ 0 a d 


With this modified data set, the hypotheses are
•



T (dˆ ) ~ N 0,2d T Σ 01a Σ1a  Σ1ab Σ 01a d



Using these parameters, we can solve for the false alarm
probability

  12

 0
 0


0

 12
0

0 

0 
 u21 

then the performance is

 d  2  0 Q 1 (1  pfa ) 

pd  1  Q





2
1


1
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H0
T (dˆ )  dˆ Σ dˆ  

H1

1

T

0.8
 = 0.4
=0

Under H0 this test statistic is a non-central chi-squared
random variable with 3 degrees of freedom; the noncentrality parameter is based on the distance between the
receivers. Generally under H1 the distribution is intractable.

p

d

0.6
0.4

To proceed further, once again consider the case of a
horizontal platform (u1 = u2) with equal horizontal
covariances under H0

0.2
0
0

1
0a

0.5

1

Σ0a  Σ0a

p

fa

Figure 3 – Example receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve for Case 2.

As a numerical example, let σ1 = σ0 = σ and |d| = 2σ.
Figure 3 shows the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve, a plot of the false alarm and detection probabilities as implicit functions of the threshold, for two
choices of correlation coefficient, 0 and 0.4. Our observation from this simple example is that any potential (positive) correlation between the two spoofed receivers improves the ability to detect the spoofer. This performance
would also improve if the receivers have a greater separation (larger |d|).
CASE 3 – KNOWN SEPARATION ONLY
To lessen the amount of information known to the detection algorithm, imagine that we know only the spacing
between the receivers’ locations, that the orientation and
absolute locations are unknown. As in Case 2, we transform the observation data to the difference of the observations

dˆ  pˆ 1  pˆ 2

 02 0
0 


2
  0 0
0 
0
0  u20 


then
2 H
0
dˆ

ˆ
T (d)  2

0 
H1

(again, the up component of the positions are ignored).
Equivalently, by multiplying through by  0 , this is
2

2
2
T (dˆ )  eˆ1  eˆ2   nˆ1  nˆ2 

H0
 '

H1

or taking the square root, we have an equivalent test on
the distance between the estimated positions

T (dˆ ) 

eˆ1  eˆ2 2  nˆ1  nˆ2 2

H0
 ''

H1

Now, under H0, since the east and north components are
iid Gaussian, the differences are also Gaussian (with nonzero means and variances 2  0 ), so T has a Rician distri2

Without orientation information (and paralleling the concepts introduced in Case 1), our choice for a test statistic
is the scale of the 3-dimenional ellipsoid (under H0) about
the origin (the 0 vector) that contains d̂ ; equivalently, the
distance (under H0) between the two estimated positions.
If this ellipsoid is small, we decide for a spoofer; if large,
no spoofer:

bution. Under H1, if we assume that

 12 0
0 


2
Σ1a  Σ1b   0  1
0 
0
0  u21 

and
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Σ1ab

  12

 0
 0


0

 12
0

0 

0 
 u21 

1

2

3

1

then the differences have zero means and variances equal

2

to 2(1   ) 1 , so T is Rayleigh distributed. With these
assumptions
2

 d

,
pfa  1  Q1 
2
 2
2 02
0







(Q1(.,.) is Marcum’s Q function – see a digital communications text), λ can be found by numerically inverting this
expression, and



2

pd  1  exp 
2
 4  1 (1   ) 
CASE 4 – THREE RECEIVERS
The two receiver formulation above naturally led to
test statistics based upon the distance between the two
estimated positions. To extend our spoofing detector concept to more receivers, we keep this focus on interreceiver distances.
Rather than pursuing a general result, we continue
with the assumptions above of a horizontal platform and
equal horizontal covariances. The test statistic will be the
sum of the estimated distances between the receivers. For
three receivers, this is

H0
T (dˆ12 , dˆ23 , dˆ13 )  dˆ12  dˆ23  dˆ13   '

H1

eˆ

d12  d13  d 23  10 0
Further, we assume that under H1 we have equal vari-

ances,  1   0 , and that the receivers are statistically
2

2

independent,   0 . Figure 5 shows the ROC curve
based upon a Monte Carlo simulation comparing the two
receiver configurations. Since a ROC curve that appears
more toward the upper left of the diagram is better for
detection, we see that the triangular configuration is better
than the linear in this example.

1
0.8

 eˆk   nˆ j  nˆ k 
2

j

Even with the simplicity of the assumed statistical
model, the correlations inherent in the pair wise differences combined with the squaring and square-root functions make the statistics of the test statistic, T, intractable.
So, instead, we consider a simple example via simulation.
Specifically, we scale the receiver spacing so that

linear
triangle

2

0.6

Again, this distance is expected to be small under spoofing.
A new and significant issue regarding the use of three
or more receivers to detect spoofing is deciding upon their
spatial configuration. To start to explore this issue, we
compare below two setups: a linear configuration and an
equilateral triangular configuration. These can be seen in
Figure 4. For comparison’s sake, we will set the interreceiver spacing so that the total of the three distances is a
constant (note that for the linear configuration, this also
includes the distance between receivers 1 and 3).

d

dˆ jk 

Figure 4 – Configurations of 3 receivers considered:
linear and triangular.

p

in which

3

0.4
0.2
0
0

0.5

1

p

fa

Figure 5 – ROC curves for 3 receivers in linear and
triangular configurations by simulation.
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CONCLUSIONS
DISCLAIMER
Our goal in this paper was to initiate the analysis of
GPS spoofing detection methods. While we have chosen a
simple detection scheme, based upon multiple, spatially
separated GPS receivers, and have made a number of
simplifying statistical assumptions in order to proceed, we
feel that we have achieved that goal and look forward to
further results on the design and analysis of spoofing detection.

FUTURE WORK
As far as we have been able to deduce, this paper
presents the first statistical analysis of a multi-receiver
spoofing detection algorithm. To make some initial headway on the problem, a number of simplifying assumptions
have been made; much room for improvement is possible.
Specifically, we propose that the following extensions
could be addressed:


While we assumed independence for mathematical simplicity, some simple correlation models
under H0 could be employed; the equal variance
assumption for the horizontal position variables
(east and north) could easily be replaced by values determined from the DOP.



Further experimentation and analysis effort
should be expended on selecting realistic models
for the data under H1; we should try to find the
worst case choices for ps and Σ1.



A more general analysis of the 3 receiver case
should be developed; other arrangements of 3 receivers should be considered; the case of 4 receivers in rectangular and diamond-shaped configurations should be considered.



As some receivers make the pseudoranges themselves available, one could develop test statistics
on them directly; as noted by one audience
member during the conference, these same techniques could be applied to comparing the phase
relationship of GPS signals at closely spaced antennas.



As the proposed tests are “snapshot” methods
employing just a single set of positions, sequential tests that exploit the inter-receiver correlations under spoofing, yet allow a decision of “I
don’t know yet” could be quite effective.



So far we have assumed a static platform with
synchronized positions; this should be expanded
to moving vehicles and time offsets between receivers.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and
are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views
of the U.S. Coast Guard.
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